Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/1783.1/127439
Contrastivism and non-contrastivism in scientific explanation
| Author |
Shan, Yafeng
|
|---|---|
| Issue Date | 2019 |
| Source | Philosophy Compass, v. 14, (8), August 2019, article number e12613 |
| Abstract | The nature of scientific explanation is controversial. Some maintain that all scientific explanations have to be contrastive in nature (contrastivism). However, others argue that no scientific explanation is genuinely contrastive (non-contrastivism). In addition, a compatibilist view has been recently devloped. It is argued that the debate between contrastivism and non-contrastivism is merely a linguistic dispute rather than a genuine disagreement on the nature of scientific explanation. Scientific explanations are both contrastive and non-contrastive in some sense (compatibilism). This paper examines the debate between contrastivism and non-contrastivism in scientific explanation. It begins with a critical review of the arguments for contrastivism, for non-contrastivism, and for compatibilism and concludes with some remarks on the prospect of the issue. |
| Publisher | Wiley-Blackwell Publishing |
| DOI | 10.1111/phc3.12613 |
| ISSN | 1747-9991 |
| Language | English |
| Type | Article |
| Access |
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